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ABSTRACT
Today, an e-commerce transaction is typically protected us-
ing SSL/TLS. However, there remain some risks in such use
of SSL/TLS. These include that of information being stored
in clear at the end point of the communication link and lack
of user authentication. Although SSL/TLS does offer the
latter, the security service is optional and usually omitted.
This is because of the fact that users typically do not have
the necessary asymmetric key pair. Since SSL/TLS protects
data only while it is being transmitted, the merchant has ac-
cess to sensitive information such as the debit/credit card
number. The storage of unencrypted debit/credit card in-
formation at the merchant server therefore represents a risk
that is not currently addressed by the use of SSL/TLS to
secure electronic payment transactions.
In this paper, we propose a payment protocol in which the
risk of having debit/credit card details stored at a merchant
server is eliminated. User authentication is also provided.
This is achieved by utilising the GSM data confidentiality
service to encrypt sensitive information. The GSM security
service is also used to provide user identity authentication.
The additional security is realised in such a way that no
management overhead is imposed on the user.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4.3 [Information Systems Applications]: Communi-
cations Applications; C.2.1 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Network Architecture and Design
General Terms
Security
Keywords
E-commerce security; mobile or Internet payment protocol;
GSM security
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
WMC’02, September 28, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
Copyright 2002 ACM 1-58113-600-5/02/0009 ...$5.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is now widely employed for e-commerce. In
an e-commerce transaction, a consumer typically makes a
payment using a debit/credit card. The communications
link between the consumer PC and the merchant server
is commonly protected against eavesdropping using SSL/-
TLS [2, 11]; even so, a number of security threats remain [5,
6, 7, 8, 10]. One reason for these remaining vulnerabilities is
that SSL/TLS does not obligate client authentication. As a
result, it is not easy to verify if the person who is making a
payment is the legitimate cardholder. A malicious user, who
may have obtained card details by some means, may then
be able to use them to make payments over the Internet
at the expense of the legitimate cardholder. Consequently,
a way to reduce the risk of such frauds is to perform user
authentication.
Apart from the lack of client authentication, using SSL/-
TLS to protect an e-commerce transaction poses another
threat. Since SSL/TLS was designed to secure the com-
munications link, the information is available unencrypted
at the destination. As a result, merchant servers have be-
come a target for attackers who wish to obtain card details.
Of course, all these problems could be avoided by use of
the SET protocol [9], a scheme devised jointly by Master-
Card and Visa to protect entire e-commerce transactions.
Unfortunately, however, SET has not taken off, apparently
for a variety of reasons. Foremost among these reasons
are the major initialisation and implementation overheads
it imposes on both e-consumers and merchants. Thus alter-
native ways of enhancing the level of security provided by
SSL/TLS, and which do not impose such major overheads,
are urgently needed.
If client authentication is to be provided by SSL/TLS,
then the user must first establish a public key pair. A secure
place will also be needed to store the private part of the key.
Usually the key is stored in the user PC and hence the user
has to use the particular machine every time a payment is
to be made. Although a smart card could be employed to
store the key and enhance mobility, not many user PCs are
equipped with smart card readers. By contrast, very large
numbers of users across the world now possess a GSM mobile
phone.
Therefore, in this paper we propose a payment protocol
in which a GSM mobile phone is used to provide card-
holder authentication and card details confidentiality in a
way that also supports user mobility. These security ser-
vices are achieved by utilising mobile phone portability and
the GSM data confidentiality service.
In this paper, the GSM data confidentiality service is first
described, followed by the proposed protocol. A threat anal-
ysis, and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the scheme are subsequently given.
2. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
Three main security services are provided by the GSM air
interface protocol. They are subscriber identity confiden-
tiality, subscriber identity authentication, and data confi-
dentiality. However, data confidentiality is the only security
service used in the proposed protocol and hence will be the
only service described here. Details of the other security
services can be found in [3, 4, 12, 16].
GSM security is based on a long-term secret key Ki, shared
between a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and the user’s
home network (which provided the SIM). Voice and sig-
nalling data sent between the mobile telephone (equipped
with the SIM) and the visited network is encrypted using a
secret session key Kc. This key is derived from the long term
key Ki as a function of a random value RAND passed from
the network to the SIM during subscriber identity authenti-
cation. The key Kc is computed within the SIM and made
available to its host mobile telephone for data encryption
(all data encryption is performed externally to the SIM).
The key is also made available to the visited network by the
subscriber’s home network’s Authentication Centre (AuC).
3. USING GSM FOR E-TRANSACTIONS
In this section, the proposed new protocol is described.
In the scheme, a consumer is required to have a GSM Mo-
bile Equipment (ME) and a SIM registered under the name
that appears on his/her debit/credit card. It is important
to note that the protocol does not need the SIM to be mod-
ified in any way. However, the ME does need some special
capabilities, as described below.
In this section, the system components required are first
described, followed by the transaction processing procedure.
3.1 System components
Five main system components are involved in our payment
protocol. These are a User System, a merchant server, an
acquirer, an issuer, and an AuC.
3.1.1 User System
The User System consists of a Mobile System (MS), which
includes a SIM, an ME, and a PC. The MS (in fact the SIM)
is responsible for outputing the key Kc. Therefore, although
an ME is needed to interact with the SIM, the protocol can
work without an ME if there is an alternative means for the
SIM to communicate with the user PC.
The means of communication used between the MS and
the user PC is not specified in this paper. However, Infrared,
a cable, or Bluetooth1 could be employed (such means of
communication are becoming commonplace as mobile de-
vices are increasingly being used for data transfer).
In the remainder of this paper the scheme is described in
the context of a User System in which the PC provides the
main platform for conducting user e-commerce, and the MS
acts to support the additional security functions. However,
in environments where the MS has sophisticated user inter-
1http://www.bluetooth.com
faces and processing capabilities, e.g. a WAP or 3G phone,
the MS could take on some or all of the PC’s tasks.
Note that in this paper, we have proposed use of the key
Kc for MAC computation where this key is normally used
for data encryption. This is a breach of key separation prin-
ciples although it may not be of significance here. However,
if this does give rise to security concerns then the key could
be modified, e.g. passed through a hash function, before be-
ing used to compute a MAC.
3.1.2 Merchant server
The merchant server is the component that interacts with
the User System to support electronic transactions. The
merchant server also interacts with the acquirer to request
a payment authorisation. The choice of the communication
link between the two is not an issue here. However, it could
be the Internet, or a special-purpose link provided by the
acquirer.
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, we suppose that the in-
tegrity of the merchant server/acquirer link is protected in
some way, e.g. via MACs or signatures; however, the means
by which this is achieved is outside the scope of the discus-
sion here.
3.1.3 Acquirer, issuer and Authentication Centre
The acquirer interacts with the issuer via the financial
network to support transaction authorisation. However, in
the proposed protocol, the issuer has the additional roles of
authenticating the cardholder, decrypting the card details,
and verifying the authenticity of the payment details and
card details.
The issuer interacts with the AuC of the user’s home net-
work in order to retrieve values necessary to utilise the GSM
security service. The choice of the communication link be-
tween the issuer and the AuC is again outside the scope of
this paper. However, it could be the Internet or a special-
purpose link provided by the mobile network operator. As
discussed in Section 4.2.3, we assume that the integrity and
confidentiality of the issuer/AuC link are provided by some
means.
The AuC is required to supply the issuer with values nec-
essary for the GSM data confidentiality service. It takes
inputs from the issuer and produces the values used for the
additional security services.
3.2 Transaction processing
The proposed payment protocol starts after a consumer
has decided to make a payment. The decision about which
purchase to make is outside the scope of this paper — we
simply assume that the consumer and the merchant wish to
perform a specified transaction.
The consumer first fills in a typical Internet purchase form
(excluding card details). In the protocol, the form is also re-
quired to contain a field for a GSM phone number. Upon
receipt of the form, the merchant server initiates the pro-
posed protocol. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.
In this figure:
• RAND denotes a randomly generated 64-bit value,
• eK(M) denotes message M encrypted (using symmet-
ric encryption) with key K,
• Kc denotes a cipher key used for encryption and MAC
computation,
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Figure 1: GSM-e-commerce payment protocol.
• ‘CD’ designates card details entered by a consumer,
• X‖Y denotes the concatenation of data items X and
Y ,
• MACK(M) denotes a MAC computed on message M
using the key K,
• ‘PD’ denotes payment details,
• ‘MN’ is a GSM phone number, and
• ‘NAME’ is the subscriber name.
Upon receipt of the form, the merchant server generates
and sends a random number (RAND) and the payment de-
tails (PD) to the user PC, as shown in message 1. The
user first checks the PD. If it is correct, the RAND is then
forwarded to the SIM, which in turn calculates the key Kc
using the received RAND and its stored key Ki as inputs
to the key derivation algorithm shared with the AuC. The
SIM then passes the generated Kc back to the ME, just as it
would normally do in a GSM telephone (i.e. the SIM is not
required to have any special functionality). The ME then
forwards the encryption key to the user PC.
The user PC uses the key Kc to encrypt the card details
entered by the user. Examples of card details include card
number, expiry date, issue number, and card verification
code (CVC). In addition to the encryption, a MAC is com-
puted on a concatenation of the card details (CD) and the
payment details (PD), again using the key Kc, to protect
the integrity of the information. The PD must include (but
is not limited to) the transaction value, date, and merchant
and transaction identification number. The enciphered in-
formation and the MAC are then sent to the merchant server
as shown in message 2 in the figure. Note that the encryp-
tion and MAC algorithms used here can be issuer-specific,
and need bear no relationship to the GSM algorithms. The
only requirement is that they are able to operate using a
64-bit GSM session key Kc.
The merchant server concatenates the received message
with its own version of PD, the RAND, and the user mobile
phone number (MN) extracted from the purchase form. The
result is sent to the acquirer where it is forwarded to the
issuer as shown in messages 3 and 4 respectively.
In order to decrypt the encrypted CD and verify the MAC,
the issuer needs to contact the appropriate AuC to retrieve
the key Kc. The issuer can either determine the identity
of the user’s home network (and hence the address of the
AuC) from the mobile number, or, if necessary, an identifier
for the AuC can be included in messages 2, 3 and 4. To
enable the AuC to respond with the right information, the
issuer sends the mobile number and the RAND to request
the AuC to respond with the subscriber name and the cipher
key. This corresponds to message 5 in Figure 1. The AuC
then responds with message 6 containing the name and key.
The issuer first decrypts the CD using the supplied key
Kc. The issuer then verifies the MAC to check the integrity
of both the CD and the information in PD, especially the
transaction ID and merchant ID. The checking of PD is
necessary in order to prevent replay attacks (see Section 4.3).
The checking of the MAC is also important because if the
MAC is valid, then the user must possess the valid SIM. If
also the subscriber name matches the cardholder name, the
cardholder is deemed to be the legitimate cardholder since
he/she possesses the SIM.
If all these processes are successful, the issuer can now
proceed with the ‘normal’ transaction authorisation. Oth-
erwise, the transaction is declined. The decision of the issuer
is reflected in the Authorisation Message (message 7) which
is then sent to the acquirer where it is forwarded to the
merchant server as shown in message 8. The protocol now
ends.
Finally note that the protocol could be enhanced to ensure
that a different key is used for every transaction, even if
the merchant fails to generate a new RAND every time.
The user system could generate its own random number,
RAND
∗ say, and then derive a transaction key Kt as a one-
way function of RAND∗ and Kc. The key Kt can then be
used instead of Kc in the protocol (RAND
∗ must also be
sent).
4. THREAT ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider threats to the proposed proto-
col. The threats can be divided into four categories: threats
to the User System, threats to the communications links
(User System/merchant server, merchant server/acquirer, fi-
nancial network, and issuer/AuC), threats in the merchant
server, and threats in the acquirer, the issuer and the AuC.
4.1 Threats in the User System
As stated previously, the User System consists of a user
PC and an MS. In this section threats to the MS are first
described followed by threats to the user PC.
4.1.1 Threats to the Mobile System
If an attacker has stolen a SIM, although a valid cipher key
Kc can be generated, he/she will not be able to complete a
transaction. The attacker still needs card details and even if
stolen card details are submitted, the fraud will be detected
as soon as the transaction is processed by the issuer. This is
because the card details, in particular the cardholder name,
will not match the subscriber name sent by the AuC.
It is clear however that if the attacker has both a complete
set of card details and a stolen SIM for the cardholder, then
the system cannot prevent an attack — unless, of course,
the SIM has been reported stolen and blacklisted by the
network.
If an attacker has stolen an ME, without a SIM, he/she
will not be able to make a fraudulent payment, regardless of
whether the corresponding card details have been obtained.
The ME is only responsible for forwarding information be-
tween the SIM and the user PC. Without a SIM, a valid
encryption key Kc cannot be generated and hence stealing
an ME does not yield financial gains to an attacker.
4.1.2 Threats to the user PC
Since the user PC does not contain sensitive information,
the threats arising from the PC are minimal. Although in-
formation that passes via the PC can be cached and at-
tacked, this information is not confidential. A debit/credit
card details and the payment details can be cached and com-
promised but the protocol still requires a corresponding SIM
to make an electronic transaction. The cipher key can also
be compromised, but since it is only a transient key and
is a function of the RAND sent from the merchant server
for each transaction, compromising this key is not a threat
unless an attacker can impersonate a merchant server and
force re-use of an old RAND value (and hence an old key
Kc). This can be prevented by requiring the user system
to authenticate the merchant server and by the provision of
integrity protection for this link (see Section 4.2.1).
If the fact that the PC has access to the card details is con-
sidered an issue, alternative implementation scenarios are
possible; in particular some of the functionality currently
allocated to the user PC could be transferred to the ME.
For example, if the ME has an appropriate user interface
(and appropriate processing capabilities), the card details
could be entered into the ME and encrypted there, denying
the user PC any access to sensitive information.
4.2 Threats to the communication links
If any of the information transferred across any of the links
is modified, then the protocol will fail. Hence, a theoreti-
cal denial of service attack exists, although there are many
simpler ways to prevent the completion of a transaction.
We now consider other threats arising to the three links
(User System/merchant server, merchant server/acquirer,
and issuer/AuC links). As stated before, the issuer/acquirer
communication link is assumed to be the financial network.
Therefore, its security is assumed here.
4.2.1 Threats on the User System/merchant server
link
Threats on this link can be divided into two types, namely
integrity threats and confidentiality threats. In this section
each piece of information that is transmitted via this link,
i.e. the RAND, the card details and the payment details,
is considered in turn against both types of threat. How-
ever, threats to RAND will not be included since modifying
or eavesdropping on this value do not enable attacks to be
launched. As a result, only the card details and the payment
details will be considered.
Integrity threats: It is important to ensure payment de-
tails (PD) integrity in order to prevent a malicious merchant
from modifying the PD to gain financial advantage, such as
charging the consumer more than is agreed upon. The PD is
protected against unauthorised modification using a MAC.
Without the key Kc, it is hard to generate a valid MAC for
a modified PD.
Although modifying the card details (CD) does not yield
any gain to an attacker, in our protocol the CD is included
in the MAC computation to ensure its integrity. It is worth
noting that including the CD in the MAC has no impact
on the message length, and it only creates a small extra
computational requirement.
As stated in Section 4.1.2 however, there are threats aris-
ing from forcing re-use of an old RAND for which the cor-
responding key Kc is known. In such a case, the MAC can
be modified and/or the CD compromised. Although the
likelihood of compromise of a key Kc by a malicious third
party is likely to be relatively small, if the threat of compro-
mise of the key Kc is a possibility, then integrity protection
for this channel and merchant server authentication is re-
quired. This can be achieved using a secure channel such as
SSL/TLS.
Confidentiality threats: It is essential to ensure the confi-
dentiality of sensitive information, i.e. the CD. In the pro-
tocol, this is provided by symmetric encryption.
Unlike the CD, the PD contains no sensitive information
and hence does not need protection against eavesdropping.
Indeed, the PD is analogous to a Point of Sale (POS) receipt
which typically contains only the store name, date, product
description, transaction value and in some cases, the last
four digits of the payment card used. Therefore, confiden-
tiality of the PD is not provided.
However, as part of a purchase form, the consumer name
along with other contact information, in particular his/her
mobile number, will be entered. Consequently, confidential-
ity of the link is needed otherwise it would be possible for
an attacker to passively eavesdrop on the link and obtain
the (MN, consumer name) pair. Confidentiality protection
for the User System/merchant server link can be provided
using a secure SSL/TLS channel just as is normally the case
for Internet transactions.
4.2.2 Threats on the merchant server/acquirer link
Threats to the CD, the RAND, and the PD are similar to
those previously described. We now consider the remaining
information, i.e. the MN and the authorisation message, in
terms of confidentiality and integrity threats.
Confidentiality threats: By monitoring the link, a list of
mobile phone numbers could be obtained. However, unlike
the threat described in the previous section, the consumer
name is not transmitted on this link. Therefore, having only
a list of phone numbers without the corresponding names is
not likely to be very valuable.
An authorisation message may contain information simi-
lar to that in a normal receipt. However, it is clear that it
does not need to contain any card details since such infor-
mation is not necessary for the merchant to complete the
proposed payment protocol. Therefore, the authorisation
message is not sensitive and hence is not protected against
eavesdropping in this protocol.
Integrity threats: Modifying the MN can only make the
protocol fail and does not yield gains to any party involved.
On the other hand, the integrity of an authorisation message
is important, since a malicious merchant could modify the
authorisation message from reject to authorise, potentially
causing a dispute. A way to prevent such a threat is to en-
sure the integrity of the message, e.g. to require the acquirer
to sign a message before sending it to the merchant.
4.2.3 Threats on the issuer/Authentication Centre link
Threats on this link can again be divided into two types,
namely integrity threats and confidentiality threats.
Integrity threats: Modifying the RAND and the MN will
only cause the protocol to fail. However, if the integrity of
information sent via this link is not ensured, it would be
possible for an attacker to manipulate this link in order to
bypass the cardholder authentication check. The attacker
could first use an arbitrary (but valid) GSM number and
symmetric encryption key to encrypt the details of a stolen
card (which, of course, will not match the GSM subscription
name). In message 6 the AuC will provide a valid Kc and the
name associated with the attacker’s GSM subscription. An
active attacker could then replace the contents of message 6
with the name associated with the stolen card details along
with the arbitrary encryption key he/she used for the en-
cryption. The issuer will accept the cardholder authentica-
tion because the key can be used to decrypt the card details
successfully and the names match. It then will proceed with
the payment authorisation process. The remainder of the
protocol will complete correctly, and the account for which
the details were stolen will be charged for the transaction.
The existence of this attack means that it is vital that the
integrity of the link between AuC and issuer is protected.
Confidentiality threats: As stated before, RAND is not
sensitive and hence confidentiality threats to the data trans-
mitted on this link are minimal. The key Kc is also not
highly sensitive, although if the key can be intercepted and
if an attacker also has access to the encrypted card details,
then it would be possible for them to decrypt the card de-
tails. However, having only card details is not sufficient to
make an electronic payment transaction in our protocol.
Confidentiality threats also arise from the fact that the
mobile number and the corresponding subscriber name are
sent across this link. Therefore, in the absence of confiden-
tiality protection on the issuer/AuC link, an eavesdropper
could find the subscriber name corresponding to any GSM
number. This would be a significant breach of GSM sub-
scriber confidentiality.
This attack means that it is important to provide con-
fidentiality and integrity for this link, and this is why we
assume throughout the paper that this link is both confi-
dentiality and integrity protected.
4.3 Threats to the merchant server
In the protocol, the merchant server does not have access
to some of the sensitive information, in particular the CD,
that it would in traditional electronic transactions, since the
information is encrypted with a key that the merchant server
does not have. The protocol therefore reduces the threat of
storing unencrypted card details at merchant servers which
is one of the major security threats when SSL/TLS alone is
used to protect electronic transactions.
The merchant server does have access to the RAND, PD,
and the authentication message. However, this information
is not sensitive. Therefore, there is no serious threat to data
confidentiality in this system component.
It may be seen that a malicious merchant could replay
message 3 in Figure 1 to re-capture a payment. However,
recall that PD must contain the charging amount, date, and
merchant and transaction ID (see Section 3.1.1). Therefore
if, for example, an unscrupulous merchant tries to re-submit
message 3 to the acquirer, the fraud will be detected as
soon as the issuer performs the authorisation. The issuer
will be able to detect that the transaction ID of a certain
merchant matches a previously submitted transaction. If the
issuer maintains a record of the RAND values used for each
payment card account, a matching RAND in two different
transactions can also be an indication of merchant fraud.
This is because the RAND must be re-used in the fraudulent
transaction to enable the issuer to decrypt the replayed CD
and hence be able to authorise the payment. The integrity
of the CD and the PD is protected by use of the MAC.
Finally, the merchant server has access to large volumes of
potentially sensitive GSM subscriber information. As part
of the user authentication process, the merchant needs the
user’s mobile number. The merchant server also knows the
name of the user since it is typically entered in the pur-
chase form. As a result, the merchant server can collect
mobile numbers and corresponding subscriber names. How-
ever, this is analogous to supplying personal contact infor-
mation in a typical order form. Privacy laws then apply and
may require order forms to contain a privacy statement or a
section for user consent if their personal data is to be used
for other purposes.
4.4 Threats to the acquirer and the issuer
Threats to the acquirer are minimal since it is responsi-
ble only for forwarding messages between the issuer and the
merchant server. Moreover, the information that is trans-
mitted via the acquirer is not sensitive.
Since the issuer is responsible for the identity authentica-
tion process, in particular the comparison of the names, it
is important to protect the issuer against any attack which
might cause the cardholder authentication process to be by-
passed.
In the protocol, the issuer retrieves from the AuC the
account holder name for any GSM telephone number. As a
result, the same user privacy issue described in the previous
section also exists here. Not only is this a sensitive privacy
issue, but requiring the AuC to supply such information may
potentially be in breach of its licence and/or data privacy
legislation. It is therefore vital that the issuer is protected
so that this information cannot be abused.
One way of mitigating this security issue is to make a
slight modification to the protocol of Section 3.2. In the
revised protocol, shown in Figure 2, in message 6 the AuC
supplies the issuer only the encryption key Kc to enable the
issuer to decrypt the card details. Subsequently, two more
messages are required in the protocol. After successfully de-
crypting the CD, the issuer sends message 7 which contains
the cardholder name as well as the mobile number. The
AuC is then required to perform the matching between the
name supplied in message 7 with the name it has associated
with the GSM number. The AuC finally sends the result of
the matching to the issuer (message 8).
This modified protocol has the advantage that the AuC
retains control of sensitive subscriber information. However,
it has the disadvantage of requiring two more communica-
tions and additional processing from the AuC.
Note that the revised protocol still allows the issuer and
the acquirer to learn the phone number for the purchaser.
To avoid such an issue, the merchant server could send an
encrypted version of the MN to the acquirer (using a public
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Figure 2: Revised protocol.
encryption key for the AuC), although messages 2, 3 and 4
would then need to contain an identifier for the AuC of the
user’s home network.
4.5 Threats to the Authentication Centre
If the integrity of the AuC could be compromised, then
there are possible attacks to the security of the user authen-
tication and encryption process and services. However, in
such an event there are also many other serious attacks to
the security of the GSM network itself, and so we assume
that the AuC is well-protected.
5. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed protocol are considered.
5.1 Advantages
The following advantages arise from use of the proposed
GSM-based payment system.
1. The protocol supports user mobility. The additional
security services, namely the user authentication pro-
cess and card details encryption, require only the cor-
rect software to be loaded on the PC, an appropriately
equipped ME and for there to exist a means to connect
the MS to the PC. In particular, the new protocol has
no key management overhead.
2. In the protocol, the PC is simply responsible for for-
warding messages between the MS and the merchant
server. Moreover, since the protocol does not involve
storing any secrets on the PC, the risks in using un-
trusted PCs are minimised.
3. The protocol provides user authentication and card de-
tails confidentiality based on GSM data confidentiality.
As a result, stolen card details can no longer be used
to conduct a successful e-commerce transaction.
4. In the protocol, the merchant server has no access to
the sensitive card details. As a result, the risks of
storing unprotected card details in merchant servers
are eliminated.
5. The protocol can work with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM.
It simply requires an appropriate equipped ME and a
user PC.
6. From the merchant point of view, the protocol will
lessen fraudulent transactions and hence reduce the
cost of ‘card not present’ chargebacks. The issuer can
also reduce the cost of card frauds by using the proto-
col.
5.2 Disadvantages
The following disadvantages arise from use of the proposed
GSM-based payment system.
1. Prior agreement is required between the issuer and mo-
bile phone service provider so that the issuer can use
the services of the AuC.
2. Issuers may be charged for the AuC services. This
cost therefore has to be weighed against the cost of
debit/credit card frauds. Of course, this is not a disad-
vantage for the GSM network provider, who may find
this a useful additional revenue stream. Merchants
may also be charged by banks in order to use the pro-
tocol. Again, the cost will have to be weighed against
the cost of ‘card not present’ chargebacks.
6. RELATED WORK
There exist other GSM-based payment systems which we
now briefly review.
• The payment scheme proposed by Claessens et al. [1]
provides user authentication using GSM. However, un-
like the scheme discussed above, it makes extensive use
of SMS messaging.
• The GiSMo (G i(nternet) S M o(pen)) scheme was
developed by Millicom International Cellular in 1999.
In this scheme, consumers must first open an electronic
wallet over the Internet and supply their mobile phone
number. Every Internet transaction is then validated
with a password sent over the mobile phone using an
SMS message. The GiSMo project, however, ended in
2001.
• Mint2 and Paybox3 are both GSM-based payment sys-
tems. They too require consumers to first open an e-
wallet. Transactions in the two protocols involve either
making or receiving calls using the delegated mobile
phone.
• The 3-D Secure Protocol has been developed by Visa
[14, 15]. The protocol aims to provide cardholder au-
thentication for merchants using a central server called
the Access Control Service (ACS). The cardholder
must enroll before using the service. When a transac-
tion is to be made, he/she will be required to enter a
Personal Account Number (PAN) in addition to other
information used in a traditional purchase form. The
merchant then has to contact the Visa Directory Server
to determine whether authentication services are avail-
able for the cardholder. If such services are available,
2http://www.mint.nu
3http://www.paybox.co.uk
the response from the Visa Directory Server will in-
struct the merchant server how to contact the ACS of
the associated issuer. The cardholder is then required
to enter a password or PIN to authenticate him/herself
to the ACS. The protocol can be extended to be used
in mobile Internet devices such as a WAP phone [13],
in which case the transaction flow remains similar to
the one specified in [15].
Broadly speaking, the other GSM-based payment systems
either use SMS messaging, require e-consumers to open an e-
wallet, or require them to make or receive phone calls using
a GSM phone. The protocol proposed here, however, does
not use any such measures. It simply utilises the GSM data
authentication session key, established during the subscriber
identity authentication process. The Visa 3-D Secure Proto-
col is similar to the proposed protocol in the way that they
both provide cardholder authentication. However, the Visa
protocol requires both the Visa Directory Server and the
ACS just to provide user authentication. The payment au-
thorisation process then has to be performed separately. As
as result, the proposed protocol appears to be considerably
simpler and more powerful than the 3-D Secure scheme.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Today most e-commerce transactions are protected in a
rather ad hoc way using SSL/TLS. This gives rise to threats
partly because of the lack of user authentication, and partly
because using SSL/TLS protects information only while it
is transmitted. This latter property means that card details
are stored unprotected at merchant servers, which gives rise
to significant threats to their confidentiality.
In this paper, we have proposed the use of GSM data confi-
dentiality to enhance e-commerce transaction processing se-
curity. The protocol provides user authentication and hence
significantly reduces threats arising from misuse of misap-
propriated card details. It also eliminates the risk of storing
card details in unencrypted form in merchant servers. The
protocol works with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM and requires
only an appropriately equipped Mobile Equipment and a
user PC. It therefore imposes minimal overheads on the
user, thus increasing the likelihood of successful use. The
gains for the merchant in terms of reduced chargebacks and
for the issuer in lessened card frauds also appear signifi-
cant. The possibility of an increased revenue stream may
also make the system attractive to GSM operators.
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